Bruce Nuclear Waste Repository: The Wrong Place at the Wrong Time – Part II Technical

Continuing from the previous post let’s look at the technical issues introduced in the just completed round of hearings on OPG’s plan to construct a Deep Geological Repository (DGR) to bury low-level wastes from the normal operations of reactors (those of both OPG and Bruce Power) and used reactor parts with long-lived radioactivity arising from the refurbishment and decommissioning projects of both entities.

Dr. Frank Greening, a retired OPG expert, pointed out that the radioactivity levels in the reactor parts to be stored in the Bruce DGR were a factor of 100 to 600 higher than OPG had claimed in its original safety case. OPG initially dismissed this as unimportant because essentially it didn’t make any difference but later they included it in a revised safety case. This failure of institutional professional expertise was unsettling and raises serious questions about the competence of those who wrote the safety case and especially the CNSC staff who reviewed and approved it.  During the hearings I would have liked to hear someone from OPG or CNSC say something like “we’re sorry we screwed up on this and we’ll try to do better in future” Instead all we had from them was smoke and obfuscation around this point.  Greening later left his wheelhouse ( as the current cliché goes) and made other accusations whose validity I’m unable to judge.

The Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP), an underground nuclear waste facility near Carlsbad New Mexico, was held out as a model in the 2013 OPG submissions for the Bruce DGR as the only one comparable to it. The facility has been operated for fifteen years by the US Department of Energy (DOE) to store low level waste from nuclear weapons development work done decades ago at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). On February 14 this year there was a fire at WIPP during which thirteen workers were mildly exposed to radiation with elevated radiation levels detected in the air around it. The cause of the accident is still unknown and WIPP will not reopen until it is fully understood which may take some years.  (The DOE safety case for WIPP calculated that the odds of a radiation accident were one in 10,000 to one in 1 million per year of operation.) Paraphrasing the OPG response at the hearings, it was argued that a similar accident couldn’t happen at the Bruce DGR because OPG’s waste is different and OPG is more careful/smarter/safety conscious than LANL, DOE and the WIPP operators. Both argument s are hard to sustain when the cause of the accident remains a mystery.  If WIPP is a model for the Bruce DGR then a fire or leak deep underground would be a much greater burden on future generations than any other option.  In my opinion the WIPP accident may ultimately kill the Bruce proposal.

The report of the so-called Independent Experts Group (IEG) was supposed to demonstrate that the risks of the DGR were less than leaving the waste above ground or depositing it in a giant granite boulder (pluton) in the Canadian Shield far from any significant body of water. The Panel wanted the IEG to use the well documented DGR prototype that AECL originally developed based on data from experiments in its Underground Research Laboratory (URL) in Manitoba just for purposes of a comparison. Instead the IEG used a hypothetical pluton located on the Bruce site beside the Great Lakes.  This misses the Panel’s point entirely. When challenged by the Panel, IEG members made several unconvincing excuses for this serious gaff. For example, they said they couldn’t consider the URL for comparison because Manitoba had a law against depositing nuclear waste in the province and AECL had declared none would be buried there.  Why either of these circumstances would rule out using the data purely for comparative purposes wasn’t clear.  In my opinion considering the fictional Great Lakes pluton came across as rather foolish.  Any numbers that could have been included from the AECL work for example were avoided in their written report which was purely subjective.  It used simple two-axis log plots that reminded me of the kind used in business schools and while reading it I expected them to discover a “cash cow” at some point in their deliberations. To say the report was highly qualitative is an understatement.

One point the IEG did make with which I fully agree is that nothing needs to be done with the waste in question for at least a hundred years. In effect they argued that there’s absolutely no need for a Bruce DGR at this time which I assume was not what OPG hired them for.

This again raises the critical argument for me. Namely is the DGR proposed for Bruce really needed?

To answer this question it’s important to emphasis that OPG has opted to build a DGR. This is purely a matter of choice and no convincing arguments have been advanced by OPG to show that a DGR is a necessity. In fact, most of the world’s reactor operators have opted to continue to store these wastes above ground as has been done in Canada to date.  In the 2013 round of hearings OPG admitted they had selected the DGR option primarily based on local support or a “social license” by the local communities given that they own the Bruce land and much of the waste is already at Bruce. A “business case” and a geological argument were later constructed to support the plan. No additional technical rationale for the necessity of the proposed DGR was presented at the hearings and therefore, I conclude it is not needed.

The answer to the key question is “no” we don’t need the Bruce DGR. .

In the next post the social license issue will be discussed.

 

Bruce Nuclear Waste Repository: The Wrong Place at the Wrong Time – Part I

As the second round of public hearings approaches the Panel examining the OPG proposal to establish a Deep Geological Repository to bury nuclear waste at the Bruce reactor site has become even more mired in an avalanche of crap. I won’t give into my inclination to compare the Panel to the inimitable Three Stooges but one of their lines (from the 1941 movie Time Out for Rhythm) is appropriate:

 “Stupidity!? We’re technical experts!”

As I noted in my November 11, 2013 post on this issue

 “psychological intimidation and harassment of hearing witnesses by the police was appalling… the Panel did a poor job of preserving the integrity of the process … I feel the hearings were badly flawed and the Panel’s conclusions should be considered as tainted.”

If that wasn’t bad enough I also pointed out OPG’s unilateral and previously unannounced intention to put long-lived decommissioning and refurbishment wastes in the DGR in addition to the relatively short lived operational wastes from reactor stations.

A lot has happened since the last round of hearings.

My previous post concerning the Federal Court decision on the bungling of the Environment Assessment for new reactor construction at Darlington argued that this ruling had focused a higher degree of legal scrutiny on CNSC decisions.  I suppose that an on-going process at this and other such hearings in the future will be looking for what lawyers call “grounds for appeal”  Again I repeat my regret that there is a legally amateur Panel rather than an experienced judge in charge of the hearings. I think it’s a safe bet that if the Panel approves the DGR then there will be an appeal to the Federal Court of Canada.

Another relevant but unrelated recent decision by the Supreme Court of Canada on First Nations land claims may also impact the hearings.  These claims span a large complex of issues in Canada and I don’t pretend to understand the decision. However, my interpretation is that it refers to aboriginal groups whose land claims have not yet been settled (“un-extinguished” in legal jargon). The Court held that bands in this position are entitled to be involved in and profit from the economic development of the claimed areas, even lands where nomadic tribes used to hunt and fish without necessarily establishing permanent settlements.  The Saugeen Ojibwa Nation (SON), the main band taking part in the DGR hearings, claims the Bruce nuclear site as traditional hunting and fishing grounds. I don’t know the status of SON land claims but I would think the Supreme Court decision will strengthen their already very strong position at the hearings.

The DGR has raised substantial protests from Great Lakes communities and from the state of Michigan in particular. The two US senators from Michigan are opposed and interestingly enough it is reported the state has a law that forbids nuclear waste storage within ten miles of the Great Lakes.  The international embarrassment the DGR has caused could be turned into a positive.  The Panel report has to be submitted to the federal government for a final decision on approval. Perhaps, cancelling of the DGR plan could be made a bargaining chip in getting US approval for the Keystone XL pipeline that Prime Minister Harper is pushing so hard. Cancellation might put two US Senators side for Keystone.

As I noted before, the DGR scheme is being pushed by local politicians from communities around the Bruce site. As a result of secret meetings with OPG that began in 2005 five local Bruce area municipalities agreed to support the DGR for a total payoff of $35 million between them to be paid over 30 years.  However, no evidence has come to light that individual politicians received personal pay offs.  Under the deal the local municipalities apparently won’t get the money if the DGR is not approved – a clear incentive for them to keep pushing it.  An independent investigation released last week showed that the municipal councils negotiated the deal in secret meetings with OPG that initially had no minutes and about which their citizens didn’t know. Voters only found out about this deal at the DGR hearings last year. The investigator concluded that this under-the-table proceeding was in clear violation of the Ontario Municipal Act. The gravity of this revelation is stressed in the Sun Times of nearby Owen Sound editorial of August 16.

“It was and remains a disgrace that a publicly owned corporation should effectively buy the influence of elected representatives and a disgrace that those municipalities allowed themselves to be bought off and still do to this day. “

If OPG management were smart, they would realize that these hearings are a continuing public relations disaster and they should use one of many possible excuses to gracefully withdraw the proposal.  They could then wait ten, fifty or even a hundred years to try again with no real harm to their corporate objectives. But in the last few years no one has accused OPG management of being smart.

The above has covered some non-technical developments since November 2013.  I intend to discuss technical issues in the next post.

 

 

Canada’s nuclear regulator gets spanked by the Federal Court

A recent Federal Court of Canada decision found that the license issued by the CNSC to construct two new reactors at Darlington was invalid because the required environmental assessment was incomplete.

First a little background might help. In 2008 the Ontario government was actively seeking to construct new reactors but hadn’t decided on what type of reactor to choose or on how many to build. Nonetheless they wanted to start environmental assessments right away and so they opted for a scheme that apparently some consultant convinced them had worked in the US.  This idea was to do a generic assessment in which the number or type of reactor to be built is not specified but based on keeping emissions to the environment, accident characteristics, and other factors within certain boundaries, later called a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) approach presumably to give it more technical credibility.

OPG (Ontario Power Generation) enthusiastically endorsed this concept. However, it was obvious even then that Ontario had again opted for political expediency over science.  In evidence I offer this quote from a post on this blog dated May 16, 2008:

“Generic environmental assessments of the new Ontario reactors to be located at the existing Bruce Power and Darlington nuclear sites are being organized.  The value of these assessments is questionable when the number and type of the reactors to be considered is unspecified. However, in an even more bizarre turn of events initial indications are that these reviews will be conducted by commissioners of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) who will in effect be reviewing their own licensing process. “

The Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) eventually took the CNSC to Federal Court after they granted a license to OPG to build two new reactors at Darlington based on a PPE-based generic environmental assessment (EA). The resulting court ruling of May 14, 2014 can be found at

http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/item/71634/index.do

Interestingly, the Court did not find the EA to be flawed because of the PPE method per se but ruled that it failed to take into account differences in waste emissions, disposal of used fuel types and aspects of accident mitigation measures. As the Court pointed out the EA could be remade to be acceptable if it were revised to address these issues.

Like many other nuclear types this development surprised me. I suppose I’d always pictured the CNSC as all powerful in the nuclear field meaning “its word is law”.  Apparently this is not the case at all. On the contrary as this judgment shows CNSC decisions can be successfully challenged in court. Understanding what this means is well worth considering since it will have major consequences for the nuclear industry down the road.

At first sight some industry observers said the ruling didn’t matter since last October (2013) Ontario finally decided not to build any new reactors (after wasting a great deal of money and many people’s time). I think claiming this makes the ruling “moot” is a naïve reaction.

The main impact is that the Court has severely undermined the credibility of the CNSC and opens up its future licensing processes to protracted litigation. Precedent is a powerful concept in law. If you don’t believe that, just look through the ruling linked above which seems to refer to lots of what previous judges have said about EAs. From this time on important decisions of the CNSC (the significant ones involving an EA) will be questioned by law suits. The suits will probably start out by noting this ruling that effectively says the “CNSC blew an EA” with the implication it may well screw up others.  With this victory the courts have now become the new battleground for anti-nuclear groups and the only limitation I can see is how much money (or legal volunteers) these organizations have for legal work.

In recent years I have noted with dismay in this blog the CNSC’s increasing inclination to agree with most schemes proposed by OPG including the not-so-clever PPE approach. The tendency has been for them to come down full bore on small firms that use radioactive sources to show they are tough regulators but to essentially agree with anything OPG suggests however dumb presumably in a  “go along to get along” spirit. This may well be, as I’ve suggested in previous posts, because the CNSC has become the main promoter of nuclear power in Canada.  I think it’s high time the CNSC reconsider its too close relationship with OPG because this ruling in part resulted from that attitude.

Only a short time ago the federal government gave the CNSC full authority to conduct its own EAs of nuclear proposals only referring when needed to Environment Canada and other federal entities such as Fisheries and Oceans and Health Canada.  That had no sooner been done when this ruling made the CNSC look incompetent after one of its licences was bounced by the Federal Court because of a bungled EA.

To be slapped down by the Federal Court constitutes a severe embarrassment to the CNSC, itself a quasi-judicial federal tribunal.  I believe it’s time for far-reaching reforms at the Commission including a weeding out of its senior management.

 

Let’s have the nuclear pill at last

Acknowledging the need for easy public access to potassium iodide (KI) pills is a further acceptance of the reality that nuclear accidents could happen in Canada.

Until the Fukushima accident the policy of Canada’s nuclear industry to KI pills was that they shouldn’t be distributed to populations near reactors because it might unnecessarily alarm people and give credence to charges that nuclear power was dangerous.  Similar opinions were held on alerting siren systems, online real time radiation data, evacuation rehearsals, and other accident mitigation measures, all then regarded as talking points for ant-nuclear critics. Thankfully, these opinions of the DOUGS (Dumb Old Utility Guys) had been fading since the Chernobyl accident and have basically disappeared since Fukushima.

We need to understand what KI pills are and what they do.  The thyroid gland in the neck regulates many important functions of our bodies such as “how quickly the body uses energy, makes proteins, and controls how sensitive the body is to other hormones” (quote from Wikipedia).    To function properly, the thyroid needs iodine which is taken up from various food sources or, in places where sufficient iodine isn’t available in the local diet, from iodized table salt. Not surprisingly adequate iodine is also essential for the normal intellectual development of children.The iodizing of salt by adding compounds such as KI to it has proved a very cheap and effective public health measure in most countries of the world.

In a nuclear accident radioactive iodine is released as a gas which can readily be inhaled and so taken up in the thyroid and then can eventually cause thyroid cancer especially in children. By taking KI pills you can load up your thyroid with harmless (non-radioactive) iodine so when exposed to the radioactive type your already iodine-saturated thyroid won’t absorb it. For this to work you need to take the KI pill before any significant release of reactor iodine gets to you. This means you have to have pills on hand and ready to use as soon as you know an accident is happening.

KI pills are very good for protecting thyroids and preventing thyroid cancer in children – both very worthy objectives.  However, they should not be viewed as a preventative or a cure-all for all types of radiation sickness as some uninformed people believe.

KI pills should be distributed to all homes within, say a 20 km radius, of reactors. Not as has been the case for example at Pickering where in a compromise scheme KI pills were stock piled in drugstores. Presumably, you go to your local pharmacy in case of a nuclear accident. There were also pills at local schools but I suppose if there were an accident outside of school hours you have to send your kids to the drugstore. Not only should the pills be in homes but there must also be an effective warning system that tells people living near reactors to take their KI pills.

The regulator and our nuclear utilities are finally considering doing exactly that after knowing since the 1950’s that it was feasible and done in other countries. There can be no excuse for any more foot dragging in providing KI pills to homes around Canadian reactors.

Canada’s nuclear industry needs leadership

Strong leadership will be needed for our nuclear industry to survive the coming decade.

The problems of the nuclear industry are often portrayed by its members as originating in public fear fanned by hostile critics and the media. Certainly there’s some truth in that but in my opinion that neglects the main reasons for its decline namely a lack of influential politicians willing to go to bat for the industry and the fact that there are very few nuclear leaders in Canada.

Dr. David Keyes was one such leader. During the world’s first major nuclear accident at Chalk River’s NRX reactor in 1952, Keyes stood at the lab’s gatehouse calmly smoking his pipe and greeting workers by name as they evacuated. As the leader of the lab, his actions damped down any panic that could have occurred and in fact he remained on site for most of the accident. Although Keyes had long departed by the time I arrived in the late 1960’s, old-timers still remembered “daddy Keyes” with respect and affection as an avuncular but strong leader.

Other industry leaders emerged in the years after Keyes who developed the CANDU reactor and pioneered its adoption by the utilities. We had politicians both federal and provincial that backed nuclear energy and pushed its growth in spite of the objections of anti-nuclear organizations as is now happening in places like Korea, Taiwan and India but that’s all gone now in Canada.

The privatization in 2001 of eight nuclear reactors of the former Ontario Hydro to form Bruce Power has proved very successful, achieving excellent performance primarily based on the strong effective leadership of Duncan Hawthorne. He has transformed the former corporate culture of Ontario Hydro to a profitable business model, has driven its high safety record, has earned the loyalty and respect of his employees and brought the unions in as partners instead of adversaries all the while keeping his shareholders happy. Although I certainly don’t agree with some of his moves, overall he remains the only credible spokesperson for the nuclear industry in Canada and its only real leader.

On the other hand the nuclear component of OPG (Ontario Power Generation) is badly in need of leadership. To be fair OPG operates in a public service environment where leadership is only the prerogative of politicians advised by legions of know-nothing fart catchers who qualified for their jobs by putting up signs and handing out literature during the minister du jour’s election campaign. Unlike Bruce Power OPG can’t lobby politicians or advertise at Maple Leaf games. Also different is the domination of OPG by rapacious unions resulting in lavish salaries and many redundant jobs. The OPG hierarchy gives me the impression of being transient and mercenary. For example, how many of the OPG imported brass have shown a commitment to this country by becoming Canadian citizens?

The coming refurbishments of ten reactors (six at Bruce and four at OPG’s Darlington station) will entail intense competition for limited resources that I called the “choke point” in a previous post. My bet is Bruce power will run rings around OPG in the contest. OPG’s reaction is the great refurbishment plan exercise by OPG documented elsewhere on this blog, an exercise in bureaucracy that proves my point that OPG management is only able to administer rather than lead. The coming refurbishments will require a high degree of cooperation and coordination that simply won’t happen between competing nuclear entities. By the way it was just announced that the plan is already more than $200 million over budget before implementation even starts in 2016

The shutdown of the six other reactors at Pickering by 2020 will cause massive layoffs that even the OPG unions with the greatest possible degree of splitting existing jobs into multiple new ones (“feather bedding”) will be unable to avert. In most cases the axed employees will not have the skill set or experience to contribute to the refurbishments. For the good of the industry one would like to see the best employees retained but this can only happen in a nuclear entity combing both Bruce Power and OPG. After 2020, OPG with four reactors will be the tail to Bruce Power’s dog with eight

For all of these reasons the only practical solution I can see to avoid future chaos is to merge the nuclear parts of OPG into Bruce Power by leasing the four Darlington reactors to them. This should have been done years ago and whether the politicians can overcome their ideological differences enough to do it remains to be seen

Warning to the nuclear industry: beware the gasman

If there are any problems with refurbishment, gas is waiting in the wings ready to replace nuclear generation.

I gave a talk on the status of nuclear power at the CERI Natural Gas conference in Calgary this week and learned a lot about the situation of the Natural Gas (NG) industry. Frankly I hadn’t realized the world had changed so much in a few short years.

The development of increasingly sophisticated and effective technologies for the fracking extraction of gas has led to a profound revolution in gas markets. There are now vast reserves of gas available at low prices. As one person at the conference said “we are awash in cheap gas”. For example, just the state of Pennsylvania has gone from producing about 0.7 Bcf/day (billion cubic feet per day) in 2009 to almost 10 Bcf/day in 2013, a production level similar to that of Alberta. That state has gone from an importer of gas to a major exporter in a few years.

Such rapid and dramatic changes have come about from the fracking exploitation of large areas of gas deposits (“plays” as the gas people like to call them) such as the Marcellus and Utica plays in the US northeast just to the south of lakes Erie and Ontario. Consequently the geography of gas markets has shifted. The gas now used in Ontario is increasingly imported from US Marcellus producers rather than from Alberta.

In the last few years, very large gas deposits exploitable by fracking comparable in size to the Marcellus formation have been identified in north east British Columbia and Alberta notably the Montney and Horn River Basin plays. The BC government is encouraging the export of this gas via pipelines to the coast and then by LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) tankers to Asian markets. However, this plan requires a big capital investment for new pipelines and LNG terminals and several years to obtain permits for their construction. Until then, this gas is stranded.

Therefore, Canadian producers are looking hard for new markets for large amounts of cheap gas. Electricity production is one possibility. Alberta will likely replace its current coal-fired generators with combined cycle gas generation but this would make only a small dint in the available supply. Replacing Ontario’s nuclear generators with gas-fired generation would consume a lot more gas. One panelist at the conference openly expressed the view that if refurbishment failed (with the implicit hope that it would) then a significant opportunity for gas would arise.

In the nuclear industry, we’ve always been told gas wasn’t a feasible base load generation option for Ontario because there wasn’t enough gas and it would cost too much. The revolutionary changes in gas supply and pricing mean that neither statement is true any longer. Now it would be possible to negotiate long (say 30-50 year) attractively priced gas contracts to generate electricity at rates competitive with today’s nuclear plants. Combined cycle natural gas generating plants can be built rapidly (about 2 years from green field) at low capital cost (about $ 1 billion for 800 MW) for electricity at similar wholesale or lower rates to nuclear plants. It appears to me that such a transition from nuclear to gas would now be feasible. I would imagine this issue is discussed in the Bruce Power board since it is partly owned by Trans Canada, a major player in gas and gas transmission.

Of course, nuclear generation still has the advantage that unlike gas generation it doesn’t produce green house gas emissions. However, if the refurbishment projects start to incur large cost overruns and schedule slippages, I’m not sure how well the climate change argument would hold up with politicians and the public. Incidentally, it seems Quebec hydroelectric exports to the US north east are declining making another a source of “green” electricity available.

The refurbishment projects must be delivered on time and on budget for Canada’s nuclear industry to survive. Complacency based on past attitudes such as “they need the reactors back on line so they’ll pay anything” would be fatal with the gasman watching so closely.

The Hearings on the Deep Geological Repository at Bruce

These hearings which concluded at the end of October 2013 concerned Ontario Power Generation’s plan to build a Deep Geological Repository (DGR) at its Bruce nuclear site to bury low level (LLW) and intermediate level (ILW) nuclear waste.

The story we are asked to believe is that Bruce area municipal politicians approached OPG in 2004 with their own plan to build this DGR. The motivation was that their towns needed money and the locals were nuclear friendly. OPG, the ever benevolent organization that it is, decided that it would like to have a DGR and agreed to pay the surrounding municipalities some $35M over a similar number of years. OPG then discovered much to its surprise and delight that the local geology was suitable even if the DGR would be built very near Lake Huron. They then applied to the CNSC which in turn set up a panel to hear the environmental arguments pro and con.

Why does OPG want to build the DGR at Bruce so near the Great Lakes? Why do they need to build it now given they have lots of room to safely store the waste for decades? I find it rather cute that the answer to both of these key questions is the same namely that local municipalities want it. In my opinion there is no need for a DGR for decades and when the time comes for one the Bruce site isn’t an appropriate place for it.

One of the local mayors is the preferred media spokesman for the DGR rather than an OPG executive presumably in order to maintain the script. I don’t think anyone is buying this story but on the plus side we should give OPG credit for not using “once upon a time” in their media releases.

To put it kindly the issue of what’s going to be buried in the DGR has evolved with time. At first it was just LLW and ILW (200,000 cubic metres) from routine reactor operations in proportions of 80% and 20% respectively.

As far as the stuff OPG said originally that they are going to bury I wouldn’t personally be upset if the whole lot was dumped off a pier into the lake at Bruce. The level of activity per unit volume is very small and the dilution factor is so huge that I wouldn’t expect more than a miniscule increase in the total radioactivity of the Great Lakes water I drink. Heaven knows there are numerous other chemicals and pharmaceutical residues already in the water. However, I wouldn’t want to see old overalls or mop heads floating around and I would hope OPG reduced such items to ashes prior to them going into the repository.

OPG has now started talking about putting the waste from refurbishment of the Darlington reactors and presumably also from decommissioning the Pickering reactors in the DGR up to another 200,000 cubic metres. This “mission creep” for the DGR is a huge step beyond from the original plan of waste from reactor operations and several intervenors pointed that out at the hearings.

Human nature being what it is, in a decade or so I would expect OPG to start talking about this DGR as a repository for high level (used fuel) waste. It’s easy to imagine the type of arguments that would be made: we already have a DGR and we don’t need to spend the extra money building another one; the Bruce DGR is working well and the locals accept it; adding the used fuel would only mean a relatively small expansion to the existing DGR; and, it’s proven too hard to get anyone else to take the used fuel and the Bruce DGR is now the only option. I don’t believe I’m being overly cynical in predicting that the Bruce DGR could well become the one and only DGR for Canada. The CNSC says that this would be illegal. This is true under current legislation but, as we have seen recently with environmental assessments, laws can easily be changed by Parliament.

I would suggest that the only type of undertaking that would guarantee that no used fuel (and if desired no decommissioning/refurbishment wastes) could be buried in this DGR would be a treaty with the Saugeen Ojibwa Nation (SON). SON has been a key player during the hearings questioning many of the issues mentioned above. Treaties with First Nations are very sensitive and, unlike in the past, are hard to break in today’s social context. More generally this could be an opportunity for First Nations as a group to demand from the federal government a comprehensive treaty covering all aspects of radioactive materials in and around the Great Lakes (Remember Bruce Power’s attempt to ship its steam generators via the lakes.) Such a document would serve to clarify future relations between the nuclear industry and First Nations to the benefit of both parties. There’s lots of time to do this because there is no urgency whatever for the DGR.

One development at the hearings I found very disturbing. Prior to the hearings the Ontario police came to the homes of some intervenors who opposed the DGR and telephoned others in order to “maintain order” although there was never any prospect of even mild public protests. They also stationed plain clothes police in the hearing rooms to discourage protests. I realize that the readers of this blog are from some 70 countries outside of Canada and may not understand or care about what is politely called “asymmetric policing” in Ontario. In a nutshell this means the OPP, the Ontario provincial police, take positions on public issues as ordered by the Ontario Liberal Party ruling the province. They then selectively enforce existing laws ignoring those that do not conform to the party’s position. The OPP has this in common with other infamous police forces that I won’t name here to avoid excessive drama.

This psychological intimidation and harassment of hearing witnesses by the police was appalling. I don’t agree with much of what the intervenors said or would have said. Nevertheless it was their democratic right to have free speech without police threats. I was unpleasantly surprised that the Panel would continue the hearings after police interference was proved. In this respect the Panel did a poor job of preserving the integrity of the process. It would have been much better to have an experienced judge in charge to ensure fairness rather than an amateur Panel chair. For this reason I feel the hearings were badly flawed and the Panel’s conclusions should be considered as tainted.